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論　説
Income Inequality and Economic Growth Nexus in 
Japan : A Multivariate Analysis
Md. Rabiul Islam
1）＊
Abstract
　Using time series data over the period 1960―2015, this paper empirically investigates the 
impact of income inequality on economic growth in Japan. It also examines the theoretical 
predictions of some of the transmission channels through which inequality aﬀects growth. 
Empirical results consistently show that income inequality signiﬁcantly hinders Japanese 
growth. Furthermore, greater inequality increases relative redistribution and reduces in-
vestment, education, and property rights protection, which may, in turn, hamper growth. 
Estimated results are robust to the inclusion of control variables, alternative measures of 
income inequality, and diﬀerent estimation techniques.
Keywords : income inequality, economic growth, Japan
JEL classiﬁcations : O15, O40, O53
１．Introduction
　The relationship between income inequality and economic growth has received signiﬁcant 
attention from researchers and policymakers over many decades. The interest has recently 
gained signiﬁcant momentum after releasing the Oxfam （2014） report which reveals that 
the richest 85 people have the same wealth as the poorest half of the world. In his best-
selling book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty （2014） has drawn attention to 
the increasing income and wealth inequality over the past few decades in most of the ad-
vanced countries which are heading back to the inequality that prevailed a century ago. 
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The recent Oxfam （2016） report shows that the gap between the richest and the rest has 
widened dramatically in the past year with 62 people now owning as much wealth as the 
poorest half of the world’s population.
　Inequality has signiﬁcantly increased in most of the advanced and developing countries 
since the 1980s. For example, the richest 10 percent of the population in the OECD today 
earn about 9.5 times the income of the poorest 10 percent, however, the ratio was at 7 : 1 
in the 1980s （OECD, 2014）. On average, income inequality has increased by 11 percent in 
developing countries between 1990 and 2010 （UNDP, 2013）. This rising inequality has be-
come one of the biggest threats to the world. Stiglitz （2012） argues that inequality is bad 
for the stability of the economy, and the United Nations （2014） states that the current lev-
el of inequality creates signiﬁcant barriers for sustainable development in the post―2015 
world. OECD （2015） warns that the gap between the rich and the poor keeps widening 
which not only threatens economic growth but also raises social, economic and political 
concerns. Despite a large and burgeoning literature, the empirical evidence on inequality-
growth nexus remains inconclusive
2）
. Most of this studies regress economic growth on in-
come inequality without providing any information about the relevant mechanism through 
which inequality inﬂuences growth.
　Japan has long been considered as an equal society and thus it may be exception to Pik-
etty’s thesis because income inequality in Japan―measured by the share of total personal 
income taken by the top １％ earners―appears to have levelled oﬀ, and even fallen a bit, 
in recent years after rising steadily from the early 1990s （Schlesinger, 2015）. However, his-
torical trend shows that income inequality in Japan has started growing since the 1980s : 
the market Gini coeﬃcients of income distribution rose from 29.63 in 1980 to 46.09 in 
2011 ; whereas the top 1％ income shares grew from 31.34％ in 1980 to 40.57％ in 2011 
（Solt, 2016 ; Alvaredo et al., 2016）. This widening income gap does not tell the whole story 
about income inequality because Japanese society has experienced changes in the popula-
tion structure, family structure, and mobility among the income classes during the last 
three decades （Ohtake, 2008）. Technological changes, population aging, increasing tempo-
rary employment and wage gap, changes in household structures, and class mobility are 
among major underlying reasons behind rising income inequality in Japan （Takanami, 2010 ; 
Ohtake et al., 2013）. This higher inequality signiﬁcantly hampers growth and raises pover-
ty in Japanese society.
　Instead of focusing on a large number of sample countries with considerable heterogene-
ity, this paper is particularly interested in investigating inequality-growth nexus in one of 
the advanced economies in East Asia, Japan. We make two contributions to the time series 
empirical literature. First, it does not only investigate the eﬀects of inequality on growth 
but also examine the potential transmission channels through which inequality aﬀects Japa-
nese growth over the period 1960―2015.  Exploring several possible transmission channels 
（　　）
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in a single study enables a wide-ranging macroeconomic analysis of the eﬀects of income 
inequality on growth. Second, it considers four alternative estimators to check robustness 
of its ﬁndings.  Estimated results consistently show signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of inequality 
on economic growth in Japan.
　The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical literature on 
inequality-growth nexus. Section 3 illustrates income inequality in Japan. Section 4 discusses 
empirical framework, methodology, and data. Section 5 undertakes the empirical estimates. 
The last section concludes.
２．Literature Review on Inequality and Growth
　The relationship between inequality and economic growth has been hotly debated among 
researchers and policy makers for many decades. The debate commenced with the argu-
ment by classical economists that income inequality is conducive for investment and 
growth in the post-industrialization period because marginal propensity to save increases 
with income and wealth and therefore, inequality channels resources towards individuals 
with higher marginal propensity to save, which in turn increases aggregate savings, invest-
ment and economic growth （Keynes, 1920 ; Kaldor, 1955）. Neoclassical growth models pre-
dict that the poor countries tend to grow faster than their wealthy counterparts due to di-
minishing returns to capital, and thereby historical inequality tends to vanish in the long 
run （Solow, 1956）. Kuznets （1955） ﬁnds a non-linear relationship between income distribu-
tion and economic development, where inequality increases with development at the ﬁrst 
stage and then decreases gradually in the later stage. However, modern growth theories 
criticize this classical and neoclassical approach and argue that income inequality adversely 
aﬀects economic growth （Galor and Zeira, 1993 ; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 ; Perotti, 1996 ; 
Easterly, 2007）.
　There are four major channels through which inequality adversely aﬀects growth in 
modern expositions. First, the fertility channel shows that poorer parents have more chil-
dren and invest less in education and therefore, an increase in inequality enhances fertility 
that lowers human capital accumulation and growth （De La Croix and Doepke, 2003）. Sec-
ond, the education channel demonstrates that in the presence of credit market imperfec-
tions and ﬁxed costs associated with the acquisition of human capital, income inequality 
may be harmful to human capital formation and growth （Galor and Zeira, 1993）. Third, the 
ﬁscal policy channel shows that inequality creates political pressure for income redistribu-
tion by increasing taxes which induces lower investment and slower economic growth 
（Persson and Tabellini, 1994）. Fourth, the socio-political instability channel illustrates that 
inequality generates socio-political instability by increasing crime, riots, and other violent 
（　　）
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activities which in turn enhances the uncertainty of property rights, and thereby reduces 
investment and growth （Alesina and Perotti, 1996）.
　If incomes or changes in incomes are persistent, one would expect that the rich would 
be getting richer and the poor would be getting poorer, leading to persistent income gap 
between the rich and the poor which in turn increasing inequality over time. A number of 
recent literature ﬁnd the evidence of persistence and signiﬁcance of long-term income in-
equality, thereby suggesting that poor families do not catch up their rich counterparts and 
thus income inequality persists across generations （Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Piketty, 
1997, Matsuyama, 2002）. Higher inequality may create political pressure for higher redis-
tributive taxes ; however, inequality may still persist by generating an incentive for better-
endowed agents to lobby against redistribution, thus preventing the implementation of eﬃ-
cient redistribution policies （Benabou, 2000, 2002）.
　Growing inequality since the 1980s may be explained, at least in part, by declining pow-
er of labor unions, increased immigration and the eﬀects of international trade and global-
ization, and growth in information technology （Katz and Murphy, 1992）. Alvaredo et al. 
（2013） identify four important factors that have contributed to the growing income shares 
at the very top level of income distribution over the past forty years. First, top tax rates 
have moved in the opposite direction from top pre-tax income shares. Second, there are 
signiﬁcant changes to bargaining power and greater individualization of pay. Third, private 
wealth relative to national wealth has followed a U-shaped path over time, and inherited 
wealth may be making the higher return, and thus inheritance and capital income taxation 
may become the central policy issue to reduce inequality. Finally, the greater correlation 
between earned income and capital income which is prominent especially in the US. Bour-
guignon and Morrisson （2002） argue that most inequalities in the early 19th century were 
due to the income diﬀerences within countries, later, it was due to income inequality be-
tween countries. Hence most of the variations in global inequality arise from income in-
equality across nations.
３．Income Inequality in Japan
　Japan used to be an equal society, and the distribution of household incomes was more 
equal during Japan’s high economic growth between the 1960s and 1970s. However, Japan 
experienced bubble economy in the late 1980s through the early 1990s ; thereby Japanese 
income inequality has started increasing since the 1980s （Takanami, 2010）.  Moriguchi and 
Saez （2008） analyse Japanese income inequality over the period 1886―2005 and ﬁnd ⒜ in-
come concentration in Japan was extremely high throughout the pre-WWII period during 
which the nation underwent rapid industrialization ; ⒝ a drastic de-concentration of income 
（　　）
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at the top took place in 1938―1945 ; ⒞ income concentration remained low during the rest 
of the century but shows some sign of increase in the last decade ; and ⒟ top income com-
position in Japan has shifted dramatically from capital income to employment income over 
the course of the twentieth century. Although top income shares in Japan in the 1920s 
were extremely high by modern standards, they were roughly comparable to those of oth-
er industrial nations, such as Britain, the United States, France, Germany, and the Nether-
lands, during the same decade （Piketty & Saez, 2003 ; Moriguchi and Saez, 2008）.
　Moriguchi and Saez （2008） argue that the quick fall in income concentration in Japan 
during WWII is primarily due to the collapse of capital income for wartime regulations and 
inﬂation. In contrast to the sharp increase in wage income inequality observed in the Unit-
ed States since 1970, the top wage income shares in Japan have remained relatively stable 
over the last thirty years. Moriguchi and Saez （2008） show that the change in technology 
or tax policies alone cannot account for the comparative experience of Japan and the Unit-
ed States. Instead, Moriguchi and Saez （2008） suggest that institutional factors such as in-
ternal labor markets and union structure are important determinants of wage income con-
centration.
　Ohtake and Saito （1998） argue that income inequality in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s 
can be explained mainly by population aging. Dispersions of income, consumption expendi-
ture, and wealth within the age group increase among the elderly, so an increase in older 
people leads to a rise in income inequality across the entire country （Ohtake et al., 2013）. 
Similar to the UK and the US, increasing income inequality in Japan since 1980s may be 
characterized by a widening income gap due to educational attainment and an increase in 
the incomes of higher income groups （Piketty and Saez, 2006）. In other words, skill-biased 
technological change （SBTC） may be one of the inﬂuential factors behind this growing in-
come inequality in Japan.
　Kawaguchi and Mori （2008） argue that both the demand and supply for skilled workers 
have increased because of the skill-based technological change （SBTC）, a rise in the num-
ber of college-educated workers induced by educational policy changes, and the aging of 
the population. The growing income gap in the late 1990s in Japan is associated with an 
increase in income and consumption inequality within the unemployed, in particular among 
those aged 45 and over （Ohtake et al., 2013）. In sum, changes in wages, household struc-
ture, taxes and the social security system, population aging, technological change, globaliza-
tion, and social mobility mainly contribute to widening inequality in Japan （Takanami, 
2010）.
（　　）
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４．Empirical Framework, Estimation Methodology, and Data
４.１　Empirical Framework
　To investigate the long-run eﬀects of income inequality on economic growth in Japan we 
estimate the following regression model over the period 1960―2015:
lnGDPCt＝β0＋β1lnINQt＋β2lnFDt＋β3lnSCHt＋β4lnOPt＋β5lnGOVt＋εt， ⑴　　
where, GDPC is the real GDP per capita, INQ indicates income inequality measured by 
two alternative indicators : the market Gini coeﬃcients （GINI） and the top one percent in-
come shares （TOP）, FD is the ﬁnancial development measured as the ratio of private sec-
tor credit to GDP, SCH is the educational attainment measured as the average years of 
schooling in the population aged 25 years and above ; OP is the openness measured as the 
ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP, GOV is the ratio of government consump-
tion expenditures to GDP, ε is the random error term, subscript  t indicates  period, and 
ln indicates natural logarithm. Gini coeﬃcients measure average income inequality, whereas 
top １％ income shares measure income inequality at the top. Leigh （2007） ﬁnds a strong 
and robust relationship between top income shares and Gini coeﬃcient and suggests that 
top income shares might be a useful  substitute for other measures of inequality.
　Among the control variables, ﬁnancial development may help an economy to allocate pro-
ductive resources, diversify risks and ease credit availability which in turn improves 
growth （Levine et al., 2000）. Educational attainment does not only enhance the ability of a 
country to develop its own technological innovation, but also increases its ability to adapt 
existing knowledge which is one of the preconditions for growth （Benhabib & Spiegel, 
1994）. Openness may be one of the important growth determinants because countries that 
are more open to the rest of the world have greater ability to absorb foreign technology 
（Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995）. Finally, higher government consumption expenditures may 
lead to the crowding out of private-sector investment and thereby negatively aﬀect growth 
（Landau, 1983）.
４.２　Estimation Methodology
　We have used four alternative estimators to estimate long-run relationship between ﬁ-
nance and growth nexus : ⅰ ARDL （Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model） of Pesaran et 
al. （2001）; ⅱ FMOLS （Fully Modiﬁed OLS） of Phillips and Hansen （1990）; ⅲ CCR （Ca-
nonical Cointegrating Regression） of Park （1992）; and ⅳ DOLS （Dynamic OLS） of Stock 
and Watson （1993）. We start with the ARDL procedure which involves two distinct stages 
in the estimations : in the ﬁrst stage, we test the existence of the long-run relationship be-
tween inequality and growth using Bounds test, once the long-run relationship is estab-
（　　）
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lished, we estimate the following ARDL version of the empirical model of Eq. ⑴ :
ΔlnGDPCt＝α0＋α1lnGDPCt－1＋α2lnINQt－1＋α3lnFDt－1＋α4lnSCHt－1＋α5lnOPt－1
　＋α6lnGOVt－1＋Σ
m
i＝1α7ΔlnGDPCt－i＋Σ
p
i＝0α8ΔlnINQt－i＋Σ
q
i＝0α9ΔlnFDt－i
　＋Σ
r
i＝0α10ΔlnSCHt－i＋Σ
s
i＝0α11ΔlnOPt－i＋Σ
u
i＝0α12ΔlnGOVt－i＋εt， ⑵　　
where, m, p, q, r, s, and u are the optimal lag lengths for each variable. The coeﬃcients 
（α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6） of the ﬁrst part of the ARDL model measure the long-run relationship ; 
whereas, the coeﬃcients （α7, α8, α9, α10, α11, α12） of the second part of the model represent 
the short-run dynamics. The null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between lnGDPC 
and its determinants is, H0 : α1＝α2＝α3＝α4＝α5＝α6＝0 ; i.e. there is no cointegration among 
the variables.  We ﬁrst estimate equation ⑵ using the OLS estimator and then calculate 
the F-statistic. The test for cointegration is provided by two asymptotic critical value 
bounds when the independent variables are either I ０ or I ⑴ . The lower bound assumes 
all the independent variables are I ０ , and the upper bound assumes they are I ⑴ . If the 
computed F-statistic is greater than the upper bound critical value, the null is rejected and 
we can conclude that a long-run relationship exists. Then we proceed to the second stage 
procedure to derive the long-run and short-run estimates using the underlying ARDL mod-
el （Pesaran et al., 2001）.
　Apart from ARDL approach, we use three additional estimators to show the consistency 
of our empirical ﬁndings. The Fully Modiﬁed OLS （FMOLS） estimator is asymptotically 
unbiased which employs a semi-parametric correction to eliminate the problems caused by 
the long run correlation between the cointegrating equation and stochastic regressors inno-
vations （Phillips and Hansen, 1990）. FMOLS employs preliminary estimates of the symmet-
ric and one-sided long-run covariance matrices of the residuals （Phillips and Hansen, 1990）. 
The Canonical Cointegrating Regression （CCR） is closely related to FMOLS, but instead 
employs stationary transformations of the data to obtain least squares estimates to remove 
the long-run dependence between the cointegrating equation and stochastic regressors in-
novations （Park, 1992）. Like FMOLS, CCR estimates follow a mixture of normal distribu-
tion which is free of non-scalar nuisance parameters and permits asymptotic Chi-square 
testing （Park, 1992）.
　The Dynamic OLS （DOLS） is a simple approach to constructing an asymptotically eﬃ-
cient estimator that eliminates the feedback in the cointegrating system （Stock and Wat-
son, 1993）. DOLS involves augmenting the cointegrating regression with lags and leads  so 
that the resulting cointegrating equation error term is orthogonal to the entire history of 
the stochastic regressor innovations （Stock and Watson, 1993）. In Monte Carlo simulation, 
Stock and Watson （1993） show the evidence that DOLS estimator is asymptotically eﬃ-
cient and it outperforms a large number of alternative estimators of long-run parameters. 
This DOLS procedure corrects for potential endogeneity problems and provides estimates 
of the cointegrating vector which are asymptotically eﬃcient （Ang, 2008）.
（　　）
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４.３　Data
　The income inequality data used in this paper are the market Gini coeﬃcients （GINI） 
and the top 1 percent income shares （TOP）. We compile the GINI and the TOP data from 
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database （SWIID） of Solt （2016） and the World 
Wealth and Income Database （WID） of Alvaredo et al. （2016）, respectively. The inequality 
data are available from 1960 to 2011, hence data for the last 4-period （2012―2015） are 
spliced with the ratio of real GDP per capita to average wages, and these data are collect-
ed from the World Development Indicators （WDI） database and the International Labour 
Organization （ILO） database, respectively. It is noted that empirical results remain consis-
tent after excluding these 4-year observations. Financial Development （the ratio of private 
sector credit to GDP） （FD）, trade openness （the ratio of the sum of exports and imports 
to GDP） （OP）, and government expenditures （the ratio of government consumption expen-
ditures to GDP） （GOV） data are also collected from WDI. Finally, educational attainment 
（average years of schooling aged 25 years and above） （SCH） are compiled from the Bar-
ro-Lee Educational Attainment Database.
　To investigate transmission channels of income inequality, we have considered few addi-
tional variables. For example, investment rate （ratio of ﬁxed investment to GDP） （INV）, 
fertility rate （births per woman） （FERT）, mortality rate （infant per 1,000 live births） 
（MORT） data are collected from WDI. The relative redistribution （REDS） is calculated as 
the ratio of the diﬀerence between market Gini and net Gini to the market Gini, and the 
data are extracted from SWIID. Finally, Fraser Institute’s Legal structure and security of 
property rights index is used to represent property rights protection （PROP）.
　Figure 1 exhibits the trend of income inequality in Japan over the period 1960―2015. The 
market Gini coeﬃcients show that income inequality declined between 1960 and 1983, its 
（　　）
Figure 1. Trends in Gini coeﬃcient and Top 1％ income shares in Japan : 1960―2015
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rate signiﬁcantly increased between 1983 and 2002 and slowed down afterward. The top 1％ 
income shares show mild ﬂuctuations in income inequality between 1960 and 1994, but in-
equality increased sharply between 1994 and 2008 and slowed down afterward.
　Table 1 reports summary statistics of the key variables used in the empirical analysis of 
this study. Most of the variables have a suﬃcient degree of identifying variations to yield 
eﬃcient parameter estimates.
５．Empirical Results
　The pre-condition for ARDL bounds test is that the underlying variables should be inte-
grated at an order less than two ; i.e. I ⑵ variables are not allowed in this procedure. We 
have considered three alternative unit root tests to assess the order of integration of the 
variables : Augmented Dickey-Fuller （ADF）, Phillips-Perron （PP）, and Dickey-Fuller Gener-
alized Least Squares （DF-GLS）. All these three approaches test the null hypothesis of a 
unit root against the alternative of stationarity.
５.１　Unit Root Test
　Estimated results in Table 2 suggest that all the variables are integrated in order one 
（i.e. I ⑴）. Hence, it is conﬁrmed that the ARDL approach, as well as other three estima-
tors （FMOLS, CCR, DOLS） can be applied to analyze the long-run relationship.
５.２　Cointegration Test
　After investigating time series properties of all variables, we proceed to ARDL bounds 
test where we have considered two periods lags to conserve the degrees of freedom.  Ta-
ble 3 reports the F-statistic for the ARDL bounds tests. The test for the presence of a 
long-run relationship results in an F-statistic of 18.06 for GINI and 9.16 for TOP. These 
statistics are greater than the 1％ upper bound of 4.63, suggesting that the null of no 
（　　）
Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Key Variables in Japan : 1960―2015
lnGDPCt lnGINIt lnTOPt lnFDt lnSCHt lnOPt lnGOVt
Mean 14.70 3.64 2.08 4.98 2.22 3.12 2.68
Std. Dev. 0.48 0.16 0.11 0.37 0.19 0.23 0.20
Minimum 13.51 3.37 1.91 4.03 1.94 2.77 2.35
Maximum 15.18 3.88 2.27 5.43 2.47 3.65 3.03
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Notes : ln indicates natural logarithm. Variable speciﬁcations : GDPC＝real GDP per capita ; GINI＝market Gini coeﬃcients ; 
TOP＝top 1 percent income shares ; FD＝ﬁnancial development measured as the ratio of private sector credit to GDP ; 
SCH＝average years of schooling in the population aged 25 years and above ; OP＝openness measured as the ratio of 
the sum of imports and exports to GDP ; and GOV＝ratio of government consumption expenditures to GDP.
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cointegrated relationship between the variables can be rejected ; hence, we can expect a 
long run relationship between income inequality and economic growth in Japan over the 
sample period. We have also checked Johansen’s co-integration test and found similar evi-
dence of long-run cointegrating relationship between inequality and growth （not reported）.
５.３　Inequality-Growth Nexus
　Table 4 provides long-run estimated results using four alternative estimators. We do not 
ﬁnd any consistent short-run estimates, and our focus is on the long-run relationship ; hence 
we have only reported the long run coeﬃcients to conserve space.  Income inequality en-
ters the long-run equation signiﬁcantly at the 5％ level for GINI and 1％ level for TOP 
（　　）
Table 2. Results for Unit Root Tests : 1960―2015
Augmented Dickey Fuller 
（ADF） Phillips-Perron （PP）
Dickey Fuller Generalized 
Least Squares （DF-GLS）
Levels 1st-diﬀerenced Levels 1st-diﬀerenced Levels 1st-diﬀerenced
lnGDPCt －2.71 －5.89*** －2.68 －5.82*** －0.60 －5.84***
lnGINIt －2.77 －4.07** －1.99 －6.57*** －2.44 －4.13***
lnTOPt －2.36 －4.55** －1.61 －4.56*** －1.98 －4.18***
lnFDt －2.59 －6.17*** －2.08 －6.07*** －1.58 －6.06***
lnSCHt －1.21 －3.75** －1.49 －3.80** －2.46 －3.49**
lnOPt －1.74 －6.83*** －1.85 －6.92*** －1.78 －6.92***
lnGOVt －2.43 －5.32*** －2.41 －5.35*** －2.37 －4.75***
Notes: For ADF and DF-GLS, Schwarz Information Criterion （SIC） is used to select the lag length and the maximum num-
ber of lags is set at ten. For PP, Barlett-Kernel is used as the spectral estimation method. The bandwidth is selected 
using the Newey-West method. The null-hypothesis in the Unit Root test is that the series has a unit root. Asterisk *, ** 
and *** indicate 10％ , 5％ , and 1％ levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. See also notes to Table 1.
Table 3. ARDL Bounds Tests : 1960―2015
lnGINIt lnTOPt
F-statistic 18.06 9.16
Diagnostic Checks: χ2NORMAL 1.13 0.25
（0.56） （0.88）
χ2SERIAL 4.12 1.91
（0.12） （0.17）
χ2WHITE 20.65 18.41
（0.71） （0.62）
χ2ARCH 0.46 4.96
（0.49） （0.17）
Notes: The test statistics in ARDL models are compared against the critical values reported in Pesa-
ran et al. （2001）. The 10％ , 5％ , and 1％ critical value bounds for the ARDL bounds test are 
（2.49, 3.38）, （2.81, 3.76）, and （3.52, 4.63）, respectively. χ2NORMAL refers to the Jarque-Bera statis-
tic of the test for normal residuals, χ2SERIAL is the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for no ﬁrst-or-
der serial correlation, χ2WHITE denotes White’s test statistic to test for homoskedastic errors, 
and χ2ARCH is Engle’s test statistic for no autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Figures in 
parentheses indicate p-values. ＊ , ＊＊ , and ＊＊＊ indicate 10％ , 5％ , and 1％ levels of signiﬁcance, 
respectively. See also notes to Table 1.
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with expected negative sign. Speciﬁcally, the average long-run elasticity of the real GDP 
per capita with respect to GINI and TOP are found to be 0.325 and 0.455, respectively. 
Therefore, estimated results suggest that a 10％ increase in income inequality reduces Jap-
anese growth by 3.25％ when inequality is measured by Gini coeﬃcient and by 4.55％ 
when top 1％ income shares represent inequality. The negative growth eﬀects of income 
inequality are more pronounced with respect to TOP than they are with respect to GINI. 
Among the control variables, ﬁnancial development signiﬁcantly enhances growth ; educa-
tion marginally increases growth, but government consumption expenditures substantially 
hamper long-run growth in Japan.
　A common feature of the large number empirical studies is that growth is regressed di-
rectly on measures of income inequality without paying suﬃcient attention to the possible 
transmission channels. Prior studies have considered investment, fertility, education, ﬁscal 
policy, and socio-political instability as potential transmission channels of income inequality ; 
however almost all of them are done in isolation for cross-country studies, and the results 
are mixed. Therefore, we investigate all these ﬁve inequality channels in the following sec-
tion. Exploring several potential transmission channels in a single study enables a wide-
ranging macroeconomic analysis of the eﬀects of income inequality on Japanese economic 
growth.
５.４　Transmission Channels of Income Inequality
　Table 5 presents long-run estimates of ﬁve major transmission channels of income in-
（　　）
Table 4. Long-run Estimates of Inequality-Growth Nexus : 1960―2015
ARDL FMOLS CCR DOLS
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ ⑻
lnGINIt －0.18** －0.36** －0.37** －0.39***
（－2.67） （－2.11） （－2.16） （－2.89）
lnTOPt －0.26*** －0.53*** －0.54*** －0.49***
（－3.25） （－2.87） （－3.09）  （3.52）
lnFDt 　0.11** 　0.20*** 　0.66*** 　0.56*** 　0.64*** 　0.57*** 　0.27** 　0.33**
 （2.61）  （5.96）  （6.92）  （5.26）  （6.29）  （5.27）  （2.19）  （2.10）
lnSCHt 　1.98* 　1.49* －0.24 －0.11 －0.17 －0.16 　0.49 　0.35
 （1.96）  （2.01） （－0.40） （－0.21） （－0.33） （－0.33）  （1.08）  （0.54）
lnOPt 　0.09 　0.01 　0.02 　0.17** 　0.02 　0.17** －0.08 　0.10
 （0.48）  （0.81）  （0.17）  （2.13）  （0.15）  （2.07） （－0.39）  （1.51）
lnGOVt －0.77*** －0.65*** －0.80*** －0.88*** －0.81*** －0.88*** －1.05*** －1.09***
（－7.15） （－8.47） （－3.35） （－3.78） （－3.20） （－3.58） （－5.20） （－5.38）
Intercept 　0.52* 　1.89**  14.59***  14.33***  14.56***  14.40***  15.81***  15.01***
 （1.73）  （2.14）  （8.52） （10.14）  （8.21） （10.50） （12.06） （13.31）
R2 　0.99 　0.99 　0.98 　0.98 　0.98 　0.98 　0.99 　0.99
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-values.  *, ** and *** denote 10％ , 5％ and 1％ signiﬁcance levels, respectively. See 
also notes to Table 1.
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equality using the DOLS estimator. Empirical results are consistent in other three estima-
tors, such as ARDL, FMOLS, and CCR, however those results are not reported to conserve 
space. We have preferred DOLS approach because it does not only provide asymptotically 
eﬃcient estimates of cointegrating vector but also corrects for potential endogeneity biases.
　Investment Channel. Inequality can aﬀect investment via savings and credit market im-
perfections. Classical economics theory predicts that a rise in inequality will tend to in-
crease investment because the rich save more and higher savings translate into higher in-
vestment （Keynes, 1920 ; Kaldor, 1957）. A contrasting argument is that investment will be 
adversely aﬀected by inequality in the presence of credit market imperfections and ﬁxed 
costs associated with investment （Galor and Zeira, 1993）. Columns ⑴ & ⑵ of Table 5 
show a  long-run signiﬁcant negative impact of income inequality on investment rate in Ja-
pan. More speciﬁcally, a 10％ increase in income inequality tends to reduce investment in 
Japan by 2.5％ , on average.
　Fertility Channel. Inequality can adversely aﬀect growth by increasing the fertility rate. 
Perotti （1996） argues that countries with more equal income distribution experience lower 
fertility rates and higher investment rates in schooling and thereby faster growth. De La 
Croix and Doepke （2003） argue that fertility and education decisions are interdependent : 
poorer parents tend to have more children and invest less in education. Therefore, coun-
tries with higher income inequality will experience a higher fertility diﬀerential, lower aver-
age education, and consequently lower economic growth （De La Croix and Doepke, 2003）. 
Columns ⑶ & ⑷ of Table 5 do not exhibit any signiﬁcant impact of income inequality on 
fertility in Japan.
　Schooling Channel. Inequality can aﬀect both the quantity and quality of education, with 
children from more aﬄuent families more likely to receive additional schooling. This is 
driven by credit market imperfections and ﬁxed costs associated with investment in educa-
tion : inequality deters the ﬁnancially constrained poor from investing in schooling because 
they are unable to cover education costs （Becker, 1960 ; Galor and Zeira, 1993）. Additional-
ly, inequality may result in under-investment in schooling if the interest rate for borrowers 
is signiﬁcantly higher than that for lenders （Galor and Zeira, 1993）. Lenders generally ac-
cept physical capital rather than human capital as collateral against their potential lending. 
Therefore, in the presence of borrowing constraints, the adverse eﬀect of income inequality 
will be more prominent on human capital than physical capital （Deininger and Squire, 
1998）. Columns ⑸ & ⑹ of Table 5 show a long-run signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of income 
inequality on educational attainment in Japan. More speciﬁcally, a 10％ increase in income 
inequality tends to decrease educational attainment in Japan by 1.2％ , on average.
　Fiscal Policy Channel. The eﬀect of inequality on government deﬁcits and debt levels 
depends on the relative political power of various interest groups : the poor will demand 
redistribution that often results in distortionary taxes whilst the rich will demand fewer 
（　　）
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redistributive taxes. While this eﬀect can arise also in autocratic regimes, it is arguably 
more likely to arise in democracies. Greater inequality in income and wealth in a demo-
cratic society may result in higher taxation and redistributive economic policies that de-
crease investment and subsequently economic growth （Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 ; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1994）. Progressive taxation and ﬁscal redistribution create a general disincen-
tive to work and invest, hence the rich will lobby against the implementation of eﬃcient 
redistribution policies （Benabou, 2002 ; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008）. Columns ⑺ & ⑻ of 
Table 5 conﬁrm a long-run signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of income inequality on relative redis-
tribution in Japan. A 10％ increase in income inequality may increase relative redistribu-
tion in Japan by 20％ , on average.
　Socio-political Instability Channel. Inequality may increase social discontent and socio-po-
litical instability which may, in turn, increase the uncertainty in the politico-economic envi-
ronment and reduce investment and growth （Alesina and Perotti, 1996）. Increasing polar-
ization may cause a deterioration in the security of property rights and contractual rights 
which may slow down the growth process （Keefer and Knack, 2002）. A highly unequal in-
come distribution may create strong incentives for organized individuals to pursue their in-
（　　）
Table 5. Channels of Inequality-Growth Nexus : 1960―2015
lnINVt lnFERTt lnSCHt lnREDSt lnPROPt
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ ⑻ ⑼ ⑽
lnGINIt －0.19** －0.35　 －0.13*** 1.83*** －0.54***
（－2.34） （－1.45） （－3.03） （3.03） （－2.79）
lnTOPt －0.31*** －0.58　 －0.11** 2.28*** －0.77***
（－3.24） （－1.51） （－2.23） （4.55） （－5.89）
lnFDt 0.08　 0.11　 0.38　 0.09　 0.02　 0.06　 0.35　 －0.29　 －1.20*** －0.61***
（0.68） （1.01） （1.18） （0.46） （0.30） （0.85） （0.49）（－0.62）（－3.44）（－3.32）
lnSCHt －0.52　 －0.55　 －3.60** －3.40* －0.07　 －0.36　 0.86　 －1.17　
（－1.41）（－1.57）（－2.25）（－1.79） （－0.02）（－0.16） （0.78）（－1.26）
lnOPt －0.12* －0.01　 0.22　 0.18　 0.02　 0.04　 0.23　 －0.99*** －0.74*** －0.35***
（－1.79）（－0.17） （1.58） （1.28） （0.58） （1.07） （0.57）（－2.89）（－3.58）（－3.40）
lnGOVt －0.68*** －0.69*** 0.97　 0.79　 0.42*** 0.43*** －0.35　 1.01　 －0.79　 0.23　
（3.53） （3.80） （0.89） （0.60） （7.89） （6.20）（－0.19） （0.92）（－1.23） （0.39）
lnGDPCt 0.19* 0.16* 0.52　 0.08　 0.18*** 0.15** －0.79　 －0.28　 －0.05　 0.27　
（1.91） （1.71） （0.56） （0.09） （2.83） （2.30）（－0.90）（－0.45）（－0.12） （0.85）
lnMORTt －0.10　 －0.44　
（－0.18）（－0.93）
lnFERTt －0.42*** －0.36***
（－6.15）（－4.70）
Intercept 4.20*** 4.25*** －2.99　 －2.99　 －1.16** －1.26** 6.45　 5.36　 7.73*** 5.74***
（4.62） （4.98）（－0.19）（－0.19） （2.38） （2.31） （0.81） （0.96） （3.05） （2.89）
R2 0.95　 0.96　 0.97　 0.97　 0.99　 0.99　 0.86　 0.78　 0.93　 0.95　
Notes: Results are based on DOLS using one lag and one lead in the estimations. FERT, MORT, and PROP indicate fertili-
ty rates, mortality rates, and security of property rights, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are t-values.  *, ** 
and *** denote 10％ , 5％ and 1％ signiﬁcance levels, respectively. See also notes to Table 1.
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terests outside the normal market activities and thus individuals in more unequal societies 
are prone to engage in rent-seeking activities or other socio-political instability manifesta-
tions, for example, violent protests, assassinations, and coups that create uncertainty and 
hamper growth （Gupta, 1990 ; Alesina and Perotti, 1996）. Columns ⑼ & ⑽ of Table 5 dem-
onstrate a long-run signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of income inequality on security of property 
rights in Japan. More precisely, a 10％ increase in income inequality may reduce property 
rights protection in Japan by 6.5％ , on average. Overall, income inequality adversely af-
fects economic growth in Japan by increasing redistribution and decreasing investment, ed-
ucational attainment, and property rights.
６．Conclusion
　Japan has long been regarded as an equal society, however, like other advanced econo-
mies, it’s income inequality has started rising since the 1980s. Despite the growing concern 
over the increasing inequality in Japan, few studies have attempted to assess the impact of 
inequality on growth as well as the potential channels through which inequality inﬂuences 
Japanese growth.  Using time series data over the period 1960―2015, this paper empirically 
examines the eﬀects of income inequality on economic growth in Japan. It also investigates 
to what extent income inequality transmits to economic growth through investment, fertili-
ty, education, ﬁscal policy, and socio-political instability channels.  Income inequality is mea-
sured by the Gini coeﬃcient and the top 1 percent income shares to capture general as 
well as top income inequality, respectively. A common feature of most of the studies is 
that economic growth is regressed directly on measures of income inequality without pay-
ing suﬃcient attention to the possible transmission channels. Yet from a policy perspective, 
the key challenge is to identify and target the appropriate underlying channels through 
which income inequality aﬀects growth.
　Using four alternative estimators, such as ARDL, FMOLS, CCR, and DOLS techniques, 
the empirical results show a signiﬁcant long-run relationship between the real GDP per 
capita and income inequality along with other growth determinants. The results also reveal 
that income inequality consistently and signiﬁcantly hampers Japanese growth. Further 
analysis suggests that income inequality adversely aﬀects growth by increasing redistribu-
tion and reducing physical investment, human capital accumulation, and protection in prop-
erty rights. However, inequality does not aﬀect fertility in Japan. These results are robust 
to alternative measures of income inequality, inclusion of a number of control variables, and 
alternative model speciﬁcations.
　Our results have important policy implications for the Japanese economy. First, rising in-
come inequality substantially hinders economic growth in Japan, hence supporting policy 
（　　）
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measures to reduce inequality are likely to improve Japanese economic prosperity. Second, 
higher inequality signiﬁcantly raises relative redistribution which may exert excess pres-
sure on the Japanese national exchequer. Democratic society tends to increase tax and ﬁs-
cal redistribution to counter inequality ; however, the rich lobby against progressive taxa-
tion, hence government may increase debt to implement its re-distributive policy which in 
turn may transfer ﬁscal burden onto future generations. The Japanese government has al-
ready increased its ﬁscal spending on social security for the elderly along with population 
aging ; hence redistribution resulting from higher inequality may increase substantial debt 
burden in Japan. Third, greater income inequality signiﬁcantly hampers accumulation of 
physical capital, human capital and security of property rights, which are considered as the 
major factors for sustainable economic development in Japan. Finally, higher income in-
equality increases the population of lower income groups, which may generate social ten-
sions and result in violent oﬀenses and suicidal tendency in Japanese society. 
Notes:
1）　Department of Economics, Monash University, 900 Dandenong Road, Caulﬁeld East, Victoria 
3145, Australia. Tel:＋61―3―95722448. E-mail : rabiul2001bd@yahoo.com ; md.rabiul.islam@monash.
edu
2）　A series of empirical studies ﬁnd either signiﬁcantly positive （Forbes, 2000 ; Partridge, 2005 ; 
Frank, 2009）, signiﬁcantly negative （Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 ; Persson and Tabellini, 1994 ; 
Deininger and Squire, 1998 ; Easterly, 2007）, insigniﬁcant or inconclusive （Quah, 2001 ; Panizza, 
2002）, or even non-linear relationships between inequality and economic growth （Banerjee and 
Duﬂo, 2003）. See, Neves and Silva （2014） for an excellent review of the literature on inequality 
and growth.
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